Connecting Pixels to Privacy and Utility: Automatic Redaction of Private
  Information in Images by Orekondy, Tribhuvanesh et al.
Connecting Pixels to Privacy and Utility:
Automatic Redaction of Private Information in Images
Tribhuvanesh Orekondy Mario Fritz Bernt Schiele
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Saarland Informatics Campus
Saabru¨cken, Germany
{orekondy,mfritz,schiele}@mpi-inf.mpg.de
Abstract
Images convey a broad spectrum of personal informa-
tion. If such images are shared on social media platforms,
this personal information is leaked which conflicts with the
privacy of depicted persons. Therefore, we aim for auto-
mated approaches to redact such private information and
thereby protect privacy of the individual.
By conducting a user study we find that obfuscating the
image regions related to the private information leads to
privacy while retaining utility of the images. Moreover, by
varying the size of the regions different privacy-utility trade-
offs can be achieved. Our findings argue for a “redaction
by segmentation” paradigm.
Hence, we propose the first sizable dataset of private im-
ages “in the wild” annotated with pixel and instance level
labels across a broad range of privacy classes. We present
the first model for automatic redaction of diverse private
information. It is effective at achieving various privacy-
utility trade-offs within 83% of the performance of redac-
tions based on ground-truth annotation.
1. Introduction
More and more visual data is captured and shared on the
Internet. Images and video contain a wide range of pri-
vate information that may be shared unintentionally such as
e.g. email-address, picture-id or finger-print (see Figure 1).
Consequently, there is a growing interest within the com-
puter vision community [4, 16, 20, 22, 38, 40] to assess the
amount of leaked information, understand implications on
privacy and ultimately control and enforce privacy again.
Yet, we are missing an understanding how image content
relates to private information and how automated redaction
can be approached.
Therefore, we address two important questions in this
Users want to share 
images containing
private information
Proposed privacy
sensitive regions
Automatic Redactions
remove private information
fingerprint, datetime
person, face, lic_plate
fingerprint, datetime
person, face, lic_plate
Figure 1: Users often share images containing private infor-
mation on the Internet, which poses a privacy risk. For ex-
ample, in the top row, user might unintentionally leak their
fingerprint. We present methods to aid users automatically
redact such content by proposing privacy sensitive regions
in images.
context. First, how can private information be redacted
while maintaining an intelligible image? We investigate
this question in a user study with highly encouraging re-
sults: we can redact private information in images while
preserving its utility. Furthermore, varying the amount of
pixels redacted results in different privacy vs. utility trade-
offs. We conclude that redaction by segmentation is a valid
approach to perform visual redactions.
We ask a second question in this paper: What kind
of privacy-utility trade-offs can be achieved by automatic
redaction schemes? Based on our first finding, we approach
this as a pixel labeling task on multiple privacy classes
(which we refer to as privacy attributes). Segmenting pri-
vacy attributes in images presents a new challenge of rea-
soning about regions including multiple modalities. For in-
stance, in Figure 1, identifying the name and datetime re-
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quires mapping the relevant pixels to the text domain for
understanding, while identifying the student id requires
reasoning over both visual and text domains. Our automated
methods address these challenges and localize these privacy
attributes for redaction via segmentation. By performing
both quantitative and human evaluation, we find these au-
tomated methods to be effective in segmentation as well as
privacy-utility metrics.
Our model and evaluation for automatic redaction is
facilitated by a new dataset that extends the Visual Pri-
vacy (VISPR) dataset [38] to include high-quality pixel
and instance-level annotations. To this end, we propose
a dataset containing 8.5k images annotated with 47.6k in-
stances over 24 privacy attributes. We will make the dataset
publicly available for future research.
2. Related Work
Text Sanitation Redaction techniques are primarily stud-
ied in the context of confidential text documents, wherein
certain sensitive entities need to be removed. Studies focus
on identification of such entities [5, 8, 9, 41, 42, 43] and
methods to prevent over-sanitation [5, 41]. However, un-
like these works which have access to dense structured text
data (e.g. documents), we deal with unstructured pixel-level
representations of such entities.
Image Perturbations for Privacy Adversarial perturba-
tions [15, 18, 36] are suggested to evade person identifi-
cation [22, 45]. However, these methods typically assume
a white-box CNN-based adversary for the specific task of
face recognition. In contrast, we propose redacting con-
tent at the expense of some utility to achieve better privacy
(measured against humans) across a broad range of privacy
classes. [4] proposes de-identifying people by generating an
alternate appearance for the person. We study a more fun-
damental problem of identifying such regions where such
methods could be directly applicable. [27, 29] study ob-
fuscation of private content, but are limited to constrained
surveillance videos and non-automated methods.
Private Information Recognition Many existing stud-
ies focus on either detecting faces [47, 49], license plates
[6, 53, 54], relationships [46, 50], age [3] or occupations
[44]. Research in determining privacy risk across a broad
range of privacy classes are typically treated as a classifica-
tion problem [38, 48, 51]. However, many studies [2, 11]
demonstrate a “privacy paradox” – users share such images
in spite of knowing the privacy risks. Hence in this work,
we propose a middle ground for reducing privacy leakage,
such that users can still share images by redacting private
content while preserving its utility.
Visual Privacy Datasets PicAlert [52] and YourAlert
[51] propose datasets with user-classified privacy labels.
VISPR [38] provides a more exhaustive dataset of 22k im-
ages annotated with a broad range of image-level privacy la-
bels. The PEViD video dataset [28] provides person-centric
bounding box annotation over 20 video sequences in a con-
strained setting. In contrast, our dataset based on VISPR
images provides pixel level annotation from a diverse set of
privacy classes.
Segmentation Identifying pixel-level labels from images
is a well-studied problem in computer vision. However,
most methods [32, 34] and datasets [10, 13, 33] focus on
segmenting common objects in visual scenes. We how-
ever focus on identifying private regions in a privacy-utility
framework, which introduces many new challenges.
3. The Visual Redactions Dataset
In this section we present our pixel-label visual privacy
dataset as an extension to the VISPR dataset [38]. We begin
with a discussion on how images (Section 3.1) and attributes
(Section 3.2) were selected for the task. This is followed by
the annotation procedure (Section 3.3) and a brief analysis
(Section 3.4) of the dataset.
3.1. Selecting Images for Pixel-level Annotation
The VISPR dataset contains 22k real-world user-
uploaded publicly available Flickr images which makes this
a great starting point for addressing the visual redaction
problem “in the wild”. 10k of these images are annotated as
safe. From the remaining 12k images we pixel-annotate the
subset of 8,473 images that contain at most 5 people. The
main reason to focus on this subset was to reduce the anno-
tation cost while maximizing the amount of non-person pix-
els. We preserve the identical 45-20-35 train-val-test split of
these images as in the VISPR dataset.
3.2. Shortlisting Privacy Attributes
The 22k images in the multilabel VISPR dataset are an-
notated using 68 image-level privacy attributes (∼5.2 at-
tributes per image). These privacy attributes are compiled
from multiple privacy-relevant sources – the US Privacy Act
of 1974, EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and vari-
ous social network website rules. Additionally, they cover
a diverse range of private information that can be leaked in
images (e.g. face, tattoo, physical disability, personal rela-
tionships, passport, occupation). Therefore, we use these as
a starting point for redactions in images. We select 42 out
of 67 privacy attributes (excluding attribute safe) for three
reasons. First, for 11 attributes (e.g. religion, occupation,
sports) typically the entire image is linked to the attribute
(e.g. scene with church or sport stadium). In such cases, the
solution to keeping the information private is to not share
such images (as proposed in [38]). We instead focus on
attributes which can be localized for redaction, such that
the image might still be useful. Second, 8 attributes were
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Figure 2: Examples and distribution of privacy attributes in the dataset.
extremely tedious to annotate, because of their strong co-
occurrence with crowd-scenes (e.g. political and general
opinion, occupation) or the effort required to outline them
(e.g. hair color). Third, 6 attributes (e.g. place of birth,
email content, national id) contained under 30 examples for
training. In spite of filtering such attributes, we still cover
a broad spectrum of information to help de-identify people
in images (such as by obfuscating faces or names). We fur-
ther merge few groups among these 42 attributes: (i) when
they occur as a complete and partial version (e.g. (complete
face, partial face) merged into face) (ii) when they localize
to the same region (e.g. (race, skin color, gender, relation-
ships) merged into person). As a result, we work with 24
localizable privacy attributes in our dataset representative of
42 of the original 67 VISPR privacy attributes (see Figure 2
for the complete list).
3.3. Dataset Annotation
In this section, we discuss the annotation procedure.
Annotation Tool and Instructions We use a customized
version of the VGG Image Annotator tool [12]. Five expert
annotators draw polygons around instances based on an in-
struction manual. A summary of instructions, definitions of
attributes and examples are provided in the supplementary
material.
Consensus and Agreement Measure Agreement is cal-
culated w.r.t. images annotated by one of the authors. We
measure agreement using Mean Intersection Over Union
(mIoU):
∑ tp
tp+fp+fn averaged over images.
Consensus Experiment and Annotating person We ob-
served 93.8% agreement in consensus task of annotating in-
stances of person in 272 images. Annotators separately
annotated person in remaining images. With an annotation
effort of ∼240 hours, we obtain 13,171 person instances
annotated over 5,920 images.
Annotating face We observed an agreement of 86.2%
(lower due to small sizes of instances) in the consensus task
for annotating face in 100 images. Using the 5,920 images
of people as a starting point, annotators annotated faces in
separate sets of images. In ∼60 hours, we gather 8,996 in-
stances of faces.
Annotating Remaining Attributes Images for each of
the remaining 22 attributes are annotated together succes-
sively by at most a single annotator. 8 of the text-based at-
tributes (e.g. name, phone no) are annotated using 4-sided
polygons or bounding boxes. Over ∼220 hours, we gather
annotation of 26,676 instances.
Text Annotations We augment all images in the dataset
with text detections obtained using the Google Cloud Vision
API to aid localization of text-based attributes. This is pro-
vided as OCR and bounding box annotation in structured
hierarchy of text elements in the order: characters, words,
paragraphs, blocks and pages. In addition, we also gather
face and landmark bounding box detections using the same
API.
Summary With an annotation effort of ∼800 hours con-
centrated over four months with five annotators (excluding
the authors), we propose the first sizable pixel-labeled pri-
vacy dataset of 8,473 images annotated with ∼47.6k in-
stances using 24 privacy attributes.
3.4. Dataset Analysis and Challenges
We now present a brief analysis of the dataset and the
new challenges it presents for segmentation tasks. Exam-
ples of the proposed attributes and their distribution among
the 8k images in the dataset are presented in Figure 2.
Popular datasets [10, 13, 33] provide pixel-level anno-
tation of various common visual objects. These objects
are common in visual scenes, such as vehicles (car, bicy-
cle), animals (dog, sheep) or household items (chair, table).
Common to all these objects are their distinctive visual cues.
s = 0.25 s = 0.5 s = 1 s = 2 s = 4
Figure 3: Dilation/Erosion of attribute fingerprint
Looking at the examples of attributes in Figure 2, one can
notice similar cues among the VISUAL attributes, but it is
not evident in the others. Recognizing TEXTUAL attributes
(such as names or phone numbers) in images instead re-
quire detecting and parsing text information and addition-
ally associating it with prior knowledge. While some of the
MULTIMODAL attributes can be associated with visual cues,
often the text content greatly helps disambiguate instances
(a card-like object could be a student id or driv lic).
We also observe a strong correlation between modalities
and sizes of instances. We find TEXTUAL instances to oc-
cupy on average less than 1% of pixels in images, while the
MULTIMODAL attributes predominantly occur as close-up
photographs occupying 45% of the image area on average.
Consequently, the privacy attributes pose challenges from
multiple modalities and require specialized methods to in-
dividually address them. Moreover, they provide different
insights due to the variance in sizes. Hence, going forward,
we treat the modes TEXTUAL, VISUAL and MULTIMODAL
as categories to aid analysis and addressing challenges pre-
sented by them.
Applicability to other problems We believe the proposed
dataset could be beneficial to many other problems apart
from visual redactions. In visual privacy, it complements
datasets to perform tasks such as person de-identification
[4, 16]. Outside of the privacy domain, we also provide
a sizable face segmentation dataset with 9k face instances,
compared to 2.9k in Labeled Faces in the Wild [23] and 200
in FASSEG [24].
4. Understanding Privacy and Utility w.r.t.
Redacted Pixels
In this section, we study how redacting ground-truth pix-
els of attributes influences privacy and utility of the image
by conducting a user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT). We will also use the results from this study as a ref-
erence point for evaluating our proposed automated meth-
ods in Section 6.2.
4.1. Generating Redactions
Given an image Ia containing attribute a, we generate
a ground-truth redacted version of the image Ia¯ by simply
blacking-out pixels corresponding to a in the ground-truth.
Spatially extending a We now want to redact fewer
or more pixels in image Ia¯ to understand how this influ-
ences the image’s privacy and utility. We generate multiple
versions of the ground-truth redacted image {Isa¯ : s ∈ S}
at different scales of redaction, such that Insa¯ contains n
times as many blacked-out pixels of Isa¯. We achieve dif-
ferent scales of redactions by dilating/eroding the ground-
truth binary mask of a, as shown in Figure 3. We use seven
scales S = {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, inf}, where I0a¯ is
the unredacted image, I1a¯ (= Ia¯) is the GT redacted image
and I infa¯ is a completely blacked-out image.
4.2. User Study
We create an AMT project of 1,008 tasks (24 attributes
× 6 images × 7 scales), each to be responded by 5 unique
workers from a pool of 29 qualified workers. Each task
contains 2 yes/no questions based on an image Isa¯, one each
for Privacy and Utility. We consider privacy and utility w.r.t.
(i) two versions of the same image: (Ia, Isa¯), and (ii) users
(AMT workers in our case).
Defining Privacy To understand if attribute a has been
successfully redacted in Isa¯, we pose the privacy question in
the form: “Is a visible in the image?”. We also provide a
brief description of the attribute a along with examples. We
consider Isa¯ to be private, if a majority of the users respond
no.
Defining Utility To understand utility of an image, we
pose the question: “Is the image intelligible, so that it can
be shared on social networking websites? i.e. does this im-
age convey the main content of the original image (i.e., the
image without the black patch)”. As a result, we define the
utility of an image independent to its aesthetic value and
instead associate it with the semantic information. We con-
sider Isa¯ to have utility, if a majority of the users respond
yes.
Measuring Privacy and Utility We label each of the
1,008 images with varying redacted scales their privacy and
utility as discussed above. For any given redaction scale s,
we aggregate privacy/utility scores simply as the percentage
of images considered private/useful. Consequently, an ideal
visual redaction has both high privacy and utility.
4.3. Analysis
We now discuss results based on the privacy-utility
scores obtained over modes and various sizes (i.e. relative
size of a in Ia) based on Figure 4.
Privacy is a Step Function We observe in Figure 4
across all plots, that a minimum number of pixels of at-
tribute a need to be removed to effectively redact it from
the image. This minimum number corresponds to exactly
the ground-truth redaction (s = 1) – redacting fewer pixels
than this makes the image non-private and redacting more
pixels achieves marginal privacy gains. More specifically,
we achieve 94% privacy with ground-truth redactions. The
imperfect privacy score is predominantly (5/9 failure cases)
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Figure 4: Privacy and Utility using various scales of ground-truth redaction over (Top row) modes (Bottom row) sizes
due to turkers overlooking important details in the question.
Apart from this, other cases involve contextual cues reveal-
ing the attribute (e.g. shadow of a wheelchair) and regions
that were not annotated (e.g. outline of a person at a dis-
tance).
Gradual Loss in Utility From Figure 4 OVERALL, we
find utility to decrease gradually as the size of redacted re-
gion increases. Another interesting observation is that util-
ity strongly depends on the size of a in the image. In the
bottom row of Figure 4, we see that for smaller GT regions
(a = 0 − 10%), we still obtain high utility at larger dila-
tions. However, as the area of the GT regions increases be-
yond 50% of the image, redaction entails blacking-out the
majority of the image pixels and hence zero utility.
Privacy and Utility What can we take away from this
while proposing automated methods to preserve privacy
while retaining utility? Due to the correlation between
modes and sizes, we can predict more pixels for smaller
attributes with minimal loss to utility. For instance, for
TEXTUAL attributes, we can predict 4x as many ground-
truth pixels for redaction. However, for larger ground-truth
regions (>50% of image) both privacy and utility are step
functions and hence making redaction a choice between pri-
vacy and utility.
GT Segmentations are a Good Proxy In general, for im-
ages over all attributes and sizes (Figure 4 OVERALL), we
see that we can already achieve high privacy while retain-
ing considerable utility of the image. Moreover, we obtain
near-perfect privacy with the highest utility in all cases at
s = 1, the ground-truth redactions. This justifies to address
privacy attribute redaction as a segmentation task.
5. Pixel-Labeling of Private Regions
In Section 3 we discussed the challenges of attributes
occurring across multiple modalities (TEXTUAL, VISUAL,
MULTIMODAL). In Section 4, we motivated how ground-
truth segmentations in our dataset make a good proxy for
visual redactions. In this section we propose automated
methods to perform pixel-level labeling (semantic segmen-
tation) of privacy attributes in images, with an emphasis on
methods tackling each modality.
We begin with a simple baseline Nearest Neighbor
(NN): A 2048-dim feature is extracted using ResNet-50 for
each image. At test time, we predict the segmentation mask
of the closest training image in terms of L2 distance.
5.1. Methods for TEXTUAL-centric attributes
To facilitate segmenting textual attributes, for each im-
age we first obtain an ordered sequence of bounding box
detections of words and their OCR using the Google Cloud
Vision API (as discussed in Section 3.3).
Proxy GT We represent n words in an image as a se-
quence [(wi, bi, yi)]ni=1, where wi is the word text, bi is the
bounding box and yi is the label. We use 9 labels (8 TEX-
TUAL attributes + safe). We assign each yi in the sequence
the ground-truth attribute that maximally overlaps with bi,
or a safe label in case of zero overlap. At test-time, we seg-
ment pixels in region bi if a non-safe label is predicted for
word wi. For the test set, we refer to predictions from this
proxy dataset as PROXY to obtain an upper-bound for our
methods on these text detections.
Rule-based Classification (RULES) We use the follow-
ing rules to label words in the sequence: (i) name: if it exists
in a set of 241k names obtained from the US Census Bureau
website. (ii) location, landmark, home address: if it
9FC
datetime
MAY
FC
datetime
2012
FC
datetime
Expiry
FC
safe
CNN
Embed
Merge
Bi-direc.
LSTM
Classify each
word in seq
Figure 5: Architecture to perform Sequence Labeling
exists in a set of 3.7k names of cities and countries from
Wikipedia’s list of locations with a population of more than
110k. (iii) datetime, phone no, birth dt: if the word
contains a digit (iv) emailadd: if the word contains the
symbol @, we predict this word and adjacent words assum-
ing a format @.
Named Entity Recognition (NER) We use the popular
Stanford NER CRFClassifier [14] to label each word of the
sequence as from a set of recognized entity classes (e.g. per-
son, organiziation, etc.). We use the model which is trained
on case-invariant text to predict one of seven entity classes.
Sequence Labeling (SEQ) We train a sequence labeler
similar to [19, 31, 35] as shown in Figure 5. We prepro-
cess by replacing all digits with 0s and stem each word to
reduce the size of the vocabulary. We tokenize the words
in the training sequences using a vocabulary of size 4,149
(number of words with at least 4 occurrences). We embed
the words using 100-d GloVe embeddings [39]. To capture
the temporal nature, we use two-level Bidirectional LSTMs.
At each time-step, we obtain a joint embedding by element-
wise multiplication of: the text embedding (256-d output of
the LSTM) and the image embedding (2048-d ResNet-50
[17] feature reduced to 256-d using an FC layer). We clas-
sify this joint embedding into 9 labels using an FC layer
followed by softmax activation.
5.2. Methods for VISUAL-centric attributes
Recent deep-learning segmentation methods have
proven to be effective in localizing objects based on their
visual cues. We propose using a state of the art method in
addition to few pretrained methods for VISUAL attributes.
Pretrained Models (PTM) We use pretrained methods
to classify three classes typically encountered in popular
visual scene datasets. (i) face: We use bounding box
face detections obtained using the Google Cloud Vision
API. (ii) person: We use the state-of-the-art segmentation
method FCIS [32] to predict pixels of COCO class “person”
(iii) lic plate: We use OpenALPR [37] to detect license
plates in images.
FCIS We retrain all layers of the FCIS model [32] for
our task and dataset. We train it for 30 epochs with learn-
ing rate 0.0005 over trainval examples and their horizontally
mirrored versions. We fine tune it from the model provided
by the authors trained for segmentation on MS-COCO [33].
We obtained best results using default hyper-parameters.
5.3. Methods for MULTIMODAL-centric attributes
Recognizing Multimodal attributes (e.g. driv lic,
receipt) require reasoning over both visual and textual
domains. We treat this as a classification problem due
to: (i) limited training examples (∼125 per multimodal
attribute) (ii) large region of these attributes (∼45% im-
age area), which provides only ∼10% utility even after
GT-based redaction (Section 4.2).
Weakly Supervised Labeling (WSL) We propose learn-
ing a multilabel classifier based on visual-only (WSL:I)
and visual+text content (WSL:I+T). If the class probabil-
ity of an attribute is beyond a certain threshold, we predict
all pixels in the image for the attribute. WSL:I is the same
approach used in [38] – a multilabel ResNet-50 [17] classi-
fier. In the case of WSL:I+T, we obtain a multimodal em-
bedding by concatenating visual and text representations.
We obtain visual representation (identical to WSL:I) with
a ResNet-50 architecture. We obtain text representation by
encoding all words in the image. We tried three such vari-
ants: (i) Bag-of-Words (BOW) encoding: Words in the im-
age are represented as a one-hot vector with vocabulary of
size 1,751. (ii) LSTM encoding: Identical to SEQ, we en-
code the word sequence using an LSTM with 128-hidden
units. We use output from the last cell as the text represen-
tation. (iii) Conv1D encoding: We use 1D convolutions to
encode the word sequence (typically used for sentence clas-
sification tasks [25]) followed by max pooling to obtain a
fixed-size text representation In all three cases, we reduce
the text-representation to 512-d using an FC+ReLU layer.
We report BOW encoding results for WSL:I+T in the rest
of the paper since this provided the best results.
Salient Object Prediction (SAL) Using WSL:I+T as the
base classifier, we use the salient object as an approximation
of the attribute’s location. We obtain class-agnostic saliency
obtained using DeepLab-v2 ResNet [7, 21].
Weakly Supervised Iterative Refinement (IR) For
document-like objects, the text regions tend to be densely
clustered in images. Hence, after classification using
WSL:I+T, we refine the convex hull of the text regions using
DenseCRF [30] to “spill into” the document region.
6. Experiments and Discussion
In this section, we discuss segmentation performance
(Section 6.1) and privacy-vs-utility performance (Section
6.2) of our proposed methods.
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n
G
T
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
ticket
name
location
datetime
location
name
home_addr
driv_licsigntr
datetime
birth_dt face
person
landmark
face
person
phys_disb
landmark
person
face
location
handwrit
datetime
name
person
face
Figure 6: Qualitative examples from our method
6.1. Evaluating Segmentation Performance
We now evaluate methods proposed in Section 5 in terms
of its segmentation performance using Mean Average Pre-
cision, suggested in Pascal VOC [13]. This is calculated by
averaging area under precision-recall curves over the pri-
vacy attributes. We use 50 thresholds uniformly spaced be-
tween 0 and 1 to obtain this curve. At each threshold t, we:
(i) binarize the prediction score masks per image by thresh-
olding pixel-level scores at t (ii) aggregate pixel-level TP,
FP, FN counts (normalized by image size) per attribute over
all images to obtain attribute-level precision and recall. We
ignore GT masks containing under 252 pixels during evalu-
ation (<1% GT masks).
Table 1 presents the quantitative results of the proposed
methods on the test set. Qualitative results in Figure 6 are
based on an ENSEMBLE, using predictions of SEQ for
TEXTUAL, FCIS for VISUAL, WCS:I+T for MULTIMODAL
attributes. We generally observe that NN underperforms
simple baselines across all modalities, highlighting the dif-
ficulty and diversity presented by the dataset.
TEXTUAL We observe: (i) Patterns, frequency and con-
text: SEQ achieves the best overall score, justifying the need
for special methods to tackle text attributes. It is reason-
ably effective in detecting datetime (Fig. 6a), emailadd
and phone no due to patterns they often display. We addi-
tionally find SEQ detect attributes which often require prior
knowledge (e.g. name, location). The common success
modes in such cases are when the words are popular enti-
ties (e.g. “Berlin” in Fig. 6a) or have discriminative vi-
sual/textual context (e.g. detecting home addr in Fig. 6b).
(ii) Challenges imposed by text detections: PROXY repre-
sents an upper bound to our textual methods. The low scores
highlights the difficulty of text detection and this is espe-
cially severe for scene and handwritten text detection, a fre-
quent case in our dataset (e.g. Fig. 6e,f). Moreover, our text
detections do not perfectly overlap with ground-truth anno-
tations. Since text regions are small, we additionally pay a
high performance penalty even for correct detections (e.g.
IoU=0.42 for home addr in Fig. 6b). Moreover, even in the
case of correct text detections, we observe failures in OCR
which affects the quality of input for dependent methods.
This can be observed by the under-performance of NER,
which is typically very effective on clean sanitized text.
VISUAL We observe: (i) The unreasonable effective-
ness of FCIS: We obtain the highest score in the VISUAL
category using FCIS. We find FCIS to be highly effec-
tive localizing visual objects commonly encountered in
other datasets (e.g. person, face). Moreover, we find it
achieves reasonable performance even when there is a lack
of training data (e.g. only <60 examples of fingerpr,
phys disb, see Fig. 6d). The common failure modes are
either difficult examples (e.g. face in Fig. 6e) or uncom-
mon visual objects (e.g. signtr in Fig. 6b). (ii) Com-
parison with Baselines: PTM achieves comparable results
for person, due to Flickr images used to train both mod-
els. However, it underperforms for face (detections are not
precise enough) and lic plate (poor performance in the
wild).
MULTIMODAL We observe: (i) WSL:I is a good simple
baseline: WSL:I achieves reasonable performance (45.4)
for multimodal attributes, compared to other modes (1.5 in
text and 20.8 in visual) although the prediction spans the
entire image. This is attributed to large size of MULTI-
MODAL instances found in images. (ii) Multimodal reason-
ing helps: We find WSL:I+T improves performance over
WCS:I by 20%, justifying the need for methods to perform
TEXTUAL
Method mAP loca
tion
home
addr
name birth
dt
phone
no
land
mark
date
time
email
add
PROXY 45.0 31.7 37.8 48.7 52.5 52.6 33.6 52.4 50.8
NN 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.5 0.0
NER 3.0 6.0 1.7 4.4 0.5 0.0 0.5 10.9 0.0
RULES 4.2 3.1 0.5 2.8 0.6 1.4 1.2 6.4 17.5
FCIS 7.2 4.3 0.2 9.8 0.1 2.5 27.6 12.9 0.0
SEQ 26.8 18.4 19.4 19.1 25.1 45.8 13.9 33.4 38.9
VISUAL
Method mAP face licp
late
per
son
nud
ity
hand
writ
phy
disb
med
hist
fing
erpr
sig
ntr
NN 13.5 8.4 11.4 33.1 6.0 32.1 11.4 7.4 11.7 0.1
WSL:I 20.8 5.0 4.3 30.3 16.4 49.9 13.7 37.7 28.8 1.3
PTM 16.4 47.6 11.6 88.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FCIS 68.3 83.8 77.9 87.0 69.7 80.7 59.0 45.8 68.1 42.6
MULTIMODAL
Method mAP cr
card
pass
port
driv
lic
stud
id
mail rece
ipt
tic
ket
NN 21.5 9.8 44.2 17.9 13.0 15.7 16.8 33.3
WSL:I+T 56.2 29.7 67.4 82.4 58.4 43.3 54.5 57.8
SAL 36.2 55.9 37.2 23.8 30.4 8.1 42.5 55.1
IR 53.6 41.7 51.2 67.8 48.1 36.9 57.2 72.5
FCIS 59.2 53.2 76.3 66.5 50.3 33.1 59.4 75.4
Table 1: Quantitative results of our methods for segmenting
privacy regions. Bold numbers denote highest and italicized
numbers second highest scores in the columns.
multimodal reasoning to detect these attributes. This is par-
ticularly necessary to disambiguate similar looking visual
objects (e.g. card-like objects driv lic and stud id, Fig.
6b). (iii) Precision-Recall trade-off : We find precision for
WSL:I+T for this method can be improved for some at-
tributes (e.g. cr card, ticket) by IR, which instead of
the entire image, predicts only the smoothened hull of text
regions. We observe FCIS achieve the best overall score
due to higher precision.
6.2. Privacy vs. Utility Trade-off by Automatic
Redaction
In the previous section, we evaluated our approaches
w.r.t. segmentation quality. Now, we ask how effective are
redactions based on our proposed methods in terms of pri-
vacy and utility?
To answer this, we once again run the user study in Sec-
tion 4.2 on AMT, but now by redacting proposed pixels of
our automated method over those exact images. To vary
the number of predicted pixels, we vary the threshold to
binarize the predicted score masks over attributes. As a re-
sult, we obtain 6-8 redacted versions for each of the 144
images (24 attributes × 6 images). Each image is labeled
by 5 unique qualified AMT workers.
Results We obtain privacy-utility scores for each thresh-
old and plot it as a curve in Figure 7. We also plot the
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Figure 7: Comparing redactions using predicted and
ground-truth segmentations
scores obtained for different dilations of redacted ground-
truth annotated region. It should be noted that perfect
redactions are unavailable to us and we use these ground-
truth based redactions (or manual redactions) only to serve
as a reference. We evaluate performance by calculating
area under the curve (AUC). We observe: (i) Overall, we
find our method obtain a privacy-utility score of 65% – a
relative performance of 83% compared to redactions us-
ing ground-truth annotation from the dataset. (ii) MUL-
TIMODAL attributes present a hard choice between pri-
vacy and utility, as these regions are often large. We find
the slightly lower AUC(gt) to be an artifact of sampling.
(iii) Although we obtain a low mAP for TEXTUAL at-
tributes, we observe an 81% privacy-utility score. This oc-
curs as we can now over-predict regions, exhibiting low pre-
cision and high recall w.r.t. segmentation, but yet retaining
high utility due to their small size. Consequently, we can
predict more text pixels “for free”.
Based on these observations, we find the automatic
redactions of our models trained on the proposed dataset
show highly promising results – they closely mimic perfor-
mance achieved by redacting ground-truth regions across a
broad range of private information.
7. Conclusion
We proposed a redaction by segmentation approach to
aid users selectively sanitize images of private content. To
learn automated approaches for this task, we proposed the
first sizable visual redactions dataset containing images
with pixel-level annotations of 24 privacy attributes. By
conducting a user study, we showed that redacting ground-
truth regions in this dataset provides near-perfect privacy
while preserving the image’s utility. We then presented au-
tomated approaches to segment privacy attributes in images
and observed that we can already reasonably segment these
attributes. By performing a privacy-vs-utility evaluation of
our automated approach, we achieved a highly encouraging
83% performance w.r.t. GT-based redactions.
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Appendices
A. Contents
The appendix contains:
• Detailed descriptions, examples and auxiliary analysis
of the 24 privacy attributes discussed in Section 3.2
• Precision-Recall curves for the methods discussed in
Table 1
• Qualitative results to supplement Figure 6
• Implementation details and qualitative results to sup-
plement Section 4 and Section 6.2
B. Privacy Attributes
In this section, we provide detailed descriptions and ex-
amples of the 24 Privacy Attributes used in the proposed
dataset. We also present a brief supplementary analysis
of the conditional co-occurrence of these attributes in the
dataset.
Detailed Descriptions and Instructions In Figures 10-
12, we provide detailed descriptions and examples of the 24
privacy attributes grouped by category, which was discussed
in Section 3.2. The descriptions briefly summarize the in-
structions provided to the annotators. The figures displays
instance-agnostic ground-truth annotations of respective at-
tributes. Ground-truth annotations are stored in a format
similar to MS-COCO [33].
TEXTUAL, signtr and handwrit attributes are anno-
tated using 4-sided polygons or bounding-boxes. For TEX-
TUAL attributes, only Latin-based words understandable by
English-speakers are annotated. For remaining attributes,
the objects are enclosed in a polygon. In case of severe oc-
clusion, the object is enclosed using multiple polygons.
Auxiliary Privacy Attribute Analysis Figure 8 repre-
sents the conditional co-occurrence matrix (i.e. probability
that attribute X occurs in an image containing attribute Y )
of the 24 privacy attributes in images. The privacy attributes
along rows and columns are sorted by category. From this
plot, we find: (i) Images of MULTIMODAL attributes of-
ten appear alongside a variety of TEXTUAL attributes (bot-
tom-left block of matrix). (ii) However, the contrary is not
true – TEXTUAL attributes do not frequently occur only in
the presence of MULTIMODAL attributes (top-right block of
matrix). (iii) person and face occur frequently alongside
other VISUAL attributes as they are central to many com-
mon visual scenes (central block of matrix).
C. Precision Recall Curves
The Precision-Recall curves of methods proposed in Ta-
ble 1 are presented in Figure 9. The first column repre-
sents averaged category performance. We plot these curves
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Figure 8: Conditional co-occurrence matrix. Groups of at-
tributes are sorted by categories. Color codes used for at-
tribute categories: TEXTUAL, VISUAL, MULTIMODAL
by thresholding our methods at 50 uniform intervals in the
range [0, 1]. Similar to Pascal VOC [13], we correct the
curves to have monotonically decreasing precision by set-
ting precision at r to be the highest precision at r′ ≥ r.
Moreover, precision at r = 0 is extrapolated as highest pre-
cision at r′ ≥ 0. We calculate Average Precision as area
under this curve using trapezoidal rule.
Auxiliary Discussion From PR curves in Figure 9, we
observe: (i) The under-performance NN indicates diversity
and difficulty of the dataset. (ii) TEXTUAL: We find the
best performance using SEQ. PROXY denotes a rough up-
per bound. We find SEQ obtain slightly higher recall as it
predicts overlapping masks. (iii) VISUAL: We find FCIS
achieve the best performance. For person, we find a sim-
ilar curve with PTM since both have the same architecture
and images from the same domain (Flickr) used for train-
ing. (iv) MULTIMODAL: FCIS achieves slightly higher cat-
egory performance compared to others. WCS:I+T generally
achieves better recall across all attributes. IR/SAL improves
precision of WCS:I+T by trading off recall.
D. Qualitative Results for Segmentation
We present qualitative results in Figure 16 to supplement
results in Figure 6 and discussion in Section 6.1. We present
the qualitative results per attribute, sorted by their Intersec-
tion Over Union (IoU) Scores. Hence, figures on top repre-
sent common success modes and figures at the bottom rep-
resent common failure modes. These results were obtained
using ENSEMBLE by choosing the operating point with the
highest IoU score per mode.
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Figure 9: Precision-Recall curves for methods in Table 1
E. Privacy vs. Utility Trade-off
In this section, we provide implementation details on the
redaction scaling strategy used for ground-truth redactions
(Section 4.1) and predicted redactions (Section 6.1). In
both cases, we perform a black-out of relevant pixels. For
phy disb, we black-out w.r.t. a bounding-box region since
we observed the silhouette is a strong visual indicator of
the attribute. In addition, we provide qualitative results for
these strategies in Figures 17 and 18 to supplement Figure
3.
Scaling Ground-truth Redactions We scale ground-
truth redactions using super-pixels to roughly adhere to
edges and object boundaries. The downscaled image is
first represented using 3000-5000 superpixels generated us-
ing SLIC0 [1]. We represent the ground-truth binary mask
per attribute using a 0-1 labeling over the graph of super-
pixels, where 1 represents the node (superpixel) belongs in
the redaction. To dilate, we iteratively add 0-nodes with
most number of adjacent 1-nodes. To erode, we perform
the same operation with an inverted ground-truth binary-
mask. We parameterize the scaling using s ∈ S (where
S = {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, inf}), representing the di-
lation/erosion factor of the ground-truth mask.
Scaling Predicted Redactions From the ENSEM-
BLE method, we obtain softmax probability score masks
Rw×h×k for k attributes per image. We compute multiple
thresholds per attribute to binarize the score masks, such
that at threshold t ∈ T , t times the number of ground-truth
attribute pixels are redacted over the entire test-set of im-
ages. We use T = {0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0}. For TEX-
TUAL attributes, we use an additional threshold such that all
detected text is redacted.
Qualitative Results Auxiliary Discussion Figure 17 and
18 displays examples of common success and failure modes
w.r.t. to the attribute mentioned. All images in these figures
are from the test set. P and U indicate privacy and utility
score, which is simply the percentage of ∼5 AMT work-
ers who agree to the privacy and utility questions. High
P indicates the image is private w.r.t. to attribute a and
high U indicates the image is intelligible. In these fig-
ures, we find: (i) For small private regions, we can redact
more pixels without affecting utility (Figure 17 location
and face) (ii) MULTIMODAL attributes often display a
hard choice between privacy and utility (Figure 17 mail)
(iii) Text detections or OCR is a common failure mode
with handwritten text for automatic redactions (Figure 18
home addr) (iv) Some difficult MULTIMODAL attributes
(Figure 18 stud id) can be detected only at high thresh-
olds, entailing complete redactions of many FP images too
(v) Figure 18 fingerpr represents one of the failure cases
for ground-truth redaction discussed in Section 4.3, where
AMT turkers overlook details in the question. In this partic-
ular case, the workers were asked to only consider finger-
prints from fingertips. However, even at s = 1 where the
finger-tips are redacted, many workers incorrectly answer
fingerprints as being visible.
Attribute Example Description
Location
(location)
Region of the image depicting where the photographer might have visited. In-
cludes the following cases: Street signs, addresses, GPS co-ordinates, flags.
Home
Address
(home addr)
Someone’s home address based on the context, such as on an identity card or
mail.
Name (name) Someone’s name such as on a name-tag or identity card. Any recognizablename in Latin-based text is included, including that of popular figures.
Birth Date
(birth dt)
Someone’s date of birth (day, month and/or year) determined based on context,
such as on identity cards or passports.
Phone no.
(phone no)
A syntactically-correct phone number (either personal or business), determined
either based on context or pattern.
Landmark
(landmark) Name of a store, restaurant or a business such as on a store front or a receipt.
Date/Time
(datetime)
A date or time, such as revealing a time-frame when the photograph might have
been captured.
Email address
(emailadd) A syntactically-correct email address
Figure 10: Descriptions and examples of TEXTUAL attributes. privacy attributes. For readability, we display images where
attributes are salient.
Attribute Example Description
Face (face) Region indicating a person’s face, containing all visible facial landmarks dis-cussed in [26]. Regions occluded by hair or masks are excluded.
License Plate
(lic plate)
Region containing a license plate or vehicle registration or identification num-
ber in any language/country. We consider any motorized vehicle (e.g. cars,
motorbike, train).
Person
(person)
Region indicating any part of a person or their reflections. Includes person’s
body along with wearables (e.g. hats, goggles, backpacks). Excludes objects
the person is holding (e.g. shopping bag, guitar).
Nudity
(nudity)
Torso and thigh region of a person, if skin is completely/partially visible in this
region.
Handwriting
(handwrit) Someone’s handwritten text in any language.
Physical
Disability
(phy disb)
Region indicating either a) special equipment used by a physically disabled
person (e.g. wheelchair) or b) region around limbs, if limbs are absent.
Medical
History
(med hist)
Any pharmaceutical consumable such as pills, capsules or syrups (including
their containers and packaging).
Fingerprint
(fingerpr)
Someone’s finger-tips if ridges are clearly visible upon zooming-in or finger-
print impressions on any surface.
Signature
(signtr) Region indicating someone’s signature
Figure 11: Descriptions and examples of VISUAL attributes. For readability, we display images where attributes are salient.
Attribute Example Description
Credit Card
(cr card) Either front, rear or any details of a credit card or similar monetary instrument
Passport
(passport) Any page (including cover) of a Passport
Drivers
License
(driv lic)
Front, rear or written details of a Drivers License or driving permit
Student ID
(stud id) Front or rear of a student identity card
Mail (mail) Mail including hand-written letters, post-cards or packages
Receipt
(receipt) A document indicating a financial transaction, such as receipts or checks
Ticket
(ticket) A ticket, such as for travel, concert or sports match
Figure 12: Descriptions and examples of MULTIMODAL attributes. For readability, we display images where attributes are
salient.
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Figure 13: Qualitative results per attribute. In each pair of images, top is ground-truth segmentation and bottom is prediction.
Pairs of images in each column are sorted by IoU scores (high to low).
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Figure 14: Qualitative results per attribute. In each pair of images, top is ground-truth segmentation and bottom is prediction.
Pairs of images in each column are sorted by IoU scores (high to low).
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Figure 15: Qualitative results per attribute. In each pair of images, top is ground-truth segmentation and bottom is prediction.
Pairs of images in each column are sorted by IoU scores (high to low).
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Figure 16: Qualitative results per attribute. In each pair of images, top is ground-truth segmentation and bottom is prediction.
Pairs of images in each column are sorted by IoU scores (high to low).
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Figure 17: Common Success Modes of Automatic Redactions. GT-based are ground-truth regions scaled and redacted as
discussed previously. Predicted are automatic redactions generated by method ENSEMBLE. P indicates privacy score and
U indicates utility score. In both cases, higher is better. Scores are indicated in green in case of majority agreement and red
otherwise.
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Figure 18: Common Failure Modes of Automatic Redactions. GT-based are ground-truth regions scaled and redacted as
discussed previously. Predicted are automatic redactions generated by method ENSEMBLE. P indicates privacy score and
U indicates utility score. In both cases, higher is better. Scores are indicated in green in case of majority agreement and red
otherwise.
